The Shifts in China’s Interpretation of and Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1949–92

Over the last three years, with the launch of the “One Belt One Road” initiative, the world has witnessed the increase of Chinese political and economic activities in the Middle East. However, Beijing’s interests in the region began much earlier with its involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Cold War. The history of Beijing’s relations with the Arabs states, Israel, and the Palestinians over more than four decades richly exemplifies the complex interaction between domestic politics and diplomacy in China during the Cold War period. This paper traces the two major shifts in China’s interpretation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and consequent changing policies of engagement in and disengagement from the conflict. The first is the 1950s and 60s when China changed its understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict from an ethnic clash manipulated by the imperialists to a class-based struggle of a revolutionary people oppressed by “Zionist capitalists”. As a result, China not only became the first major non-Arab patron of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) but called for a “people’s war” against Israel. The second major change was during the 1970s and 80s when Beijing shifted its approach to the whole region, reexamined the Arab-Israeli conflict from multiple angles, and actively supported political settlements toward an enduring peace.