The paper builds a model grounded in merchants’ reservation values, a government-imposed mandated payment ratio, market discounting of token coins, and an extension of the quantity theory of money with nonlinear hot-potato velocity dynamics. Crucially, overvaluation induces unauthorized minting, which melted down standard cash and expanded token supply through a logistic response to ICR. Calibrated with Qing monetary and fiscal evidence, the model delivers two core results. First, token-coin seigniorage exhibits an inverted-U: small denominations generate net fiscal revenue, but large denominations collapse once inflation, rising velocity, illicit minting, and enforcement costs erode real gains. Second, when debasement is implemented primarily through administratively inflated nominal conversion rather than metallurgical reduction, fiscal extraction does not scale with denomination and can rapidly become self-defeating.
Historical validation validates these predictions: high-denomination coins were short-lived, while the silver–copper cash ratio rose sharply during 1851–1861 nationwide. My research thus reframes debasement as a regime-dependent fiscal technology, providing a portable metric for systematic China–Europe comparison.