The Political Economy of Authoritarian Consolidation: Brazil, 1964–67

The first years of Brazil’s post-1964 dictatorship have been described as pro-business and pro-foreign capital; some have even defined the period as neoliberal avant la lettre. This assessment has been largely based on the business community’s support of the 1964 military coup and on the stated goals of the regime’s early economic technocrats. However, a closer look at the business community’s reactions to post-1964 economic policy reveals an altogether different picture. By analyzing untapped Chamber of Commerce meeting transcripts, underused statistics, U.S. diplomatic sources, and Brazilian businessmen’s personal archives, I document the business community’s hostility — and powerlessness — vis-à-vis the dictatorship’s early economic policies. Faced with excruciating constraints on credit and tax hikes, Brazilian and foreign businessmen alike debated over how to fight back. Fearing government retaliation, they adopted a non-confrontational strategy in public under president Castello Branco. Instead, they mobilized backstage to ensure that his eventual successor would adopt more amenable policies. In light of this evidence, I find it improper to characterize the post-1964 regime as a “business-military dictatorship” or a “dictatorship of business,” as many Brazilian historians have recently come to do.