Between Two Flames: How Metternich Saved Europe from Napoleon's and Alexander I's Dominance, 1813–14

It was neither an army nor a military commander nor a state that brought Napoleon down – it was a diplomat. When Austrian Foreign Minister Prince Metternich took control of the sixth and final coalition against Napoleon, he succeeded where the five previous coalitions had failed: in liberating Europe from French hegemony. But that was not the end of it. What worried Metternich most on the march to Paris was no longer Napoleon himself, whom he would have liked to keep as a counterweight to Russia for reasons of European balance, but Russia's ambition to replace French hegemony with its own. That is why Metternich played all the powers off against each other at exactly the right moment – before every battle, after every battle – in order to prevent precisely that from happening. He tried to convince Prussia to break its alliance with Russia and join him in balancing against it. On several occasions during the march on Paris, he threatened Alexander I, saying that he would withdraw from the coalition and turn against him if he attempted to occupy the German states or establish a war corridor through them. Finally, when Napoleon's downfall became apparent, he had to position Great Britain in Europe as a counterweight to Russia. The Congress of Vienna is far less relevant in terms of its strategic significance than the last coalition war, because in that one year Europe had already been reorganized territorially. Metternich would not have embarked on a march to Paris if Europe's reorganization on the basis of the balance of power had not been predetermined.

that has yet to be fully appreciated. He accomplished what the Allies had failed to do in previous and future wars.