The Post–World War II Soviet Union: A Fragile Giant Through the Lens of George Kennan

This project reexamines the early Cold War years (1945–1947) in U.S.–Soviet foreign relations through a close textual analysis of George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram (1946), his famous X article (1947), and related diplomatic communications to the U.S. Department of State in 1945-1946. The study challenges the conventional understanding that Kennan’s telegram directly inspired the Truman administration’s containment policy. Instead, it argues that President Truman and his advisors selectively interpreted Kennan’s analysis to justify an already hardening stance toward the Soviet Union—transforming what was originally Kennan’s nuanced psychological and historical assessment into a rigid policy of global confrontation.

Drawing on primary sources, including The Long Telegram and Kennan’s telegrams from 1945–1946, this research situates Kennan’s thought within his broader intellectual and historical context. In contrast to the popular interpretation of the telegram as a blueprint for containment, Kennan portrayed the Soviet Union as a deeply insecure state driven more by defensive paranoia and justification for his dictatorship than expansionist ambition. His diagnosis of Stalin’s mindset was rooted in centuries of Russian geopolitical vulnerability, historical backwardness, and the psychological insecurity of a regime lacking traditional legitimacy. For Kennan, Soviet foreign policy was reactive rather than aggressive, a mechanism of self-preservation rather than conquest.

However, the Truman administration received the telegram through an ideological lens shaped by postwar anxieties and a desire to assert American leadership. In this sense, the telegram functioned less as an analytical guide and more as a mirror reflecting Washington’s preexisting assumptions about the Soviet threat. This reinterpretation suggests that the origins of containment policy were less about responding to Kennan’s insights and more about misreading them.

The project’s historical significance lies in its contribution to reevaluating the intellectual foundations of the Cold War. By highlighting the gap between Kennan’s intended message and Truman’s implementation, it offers a more complex view of early U.S.–Soviet relations, one shaped as much by misunderstanding as by ideology.

The poster will present Kennan’s Long Telegram and related documents through an interpretive, text-centered design. Selected excerpts and quotations from Kennan’s writings will serve as the primary visual elements, arranged systematically to illustrate key points in the argument. Visual distinction will be created through color and typography: primary-source quotations will appear in one color and font style to emphasize their historical authenticity, while analytical commentary will appear in a contrasting color to represent interpretation. Other textual components—such as the title, section headings, and conclusion—will be formatted in a third, neutral color to maintain visual coherence. This clean, structured layout allows the viewer to trace the dialogue between Kennan’s original words and the project’s analysis, making visible the interpretive process.