Framing Ho Chi Minh: Sino–Vietnamese Relations and Personal Diplomacy During the Second Indochina War, 1955–75

While the Sino-Vietnamese relationship during the Second Indochina War (1955-1975) has traditionally been framed through geopolitical and ideological factors (such as military cooperation, communist solidarity, and strategic alignment), this study highlights the indispensable role of personal diplomacy. In contrast to the ‘great man of history’ and ‘personalist’ approaches to understanding the role of key political leaders and diplomats, the concept of ‘personal diplomacy’ emphasizes neither the political power nor ingenuity of specific individuals but instead highlights their human relations and representations. This study argues that Ho Chi Minh, Chairman of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP), anchored Sino-Vietnamese relations in two ways: his personal sodalities with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders and his role as a symbol in personifying Sino-Vietnamese friendship.

Firstly, Ho Chi Minh’s close relationships with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other CCP leaders, established before the war, laid a foundation of trust and revolutionary camaraderie that was frequently invoked in diplomatic discourse. His deep understanding of the CCP’s political culture allowed him to engage with CCP leadership beyond traditional state-to-state interactions. Private visits to China were critical in this diplomacy, allowing informal discussions that facilitated direct communication and wartime coordination. These visits helped strengthen political ties, manage ideological tensions, and reinforce China’s role as Vietnam’s key ally.

Secondly, Ho Chi Minh played a role as a symbol for the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, even when he was no longer officially involved in diplomatic relations. Chinese propaganda took advantage of this by framing him as “Uncle Ho” and a “brotherly friend” to sustain the image of a shared revolutionary struggle while positioning China as Vietnam’s indispensable ally. This portrayal served a dual purpose: domestically, it justified China’s support for Vietnam, while internationally, it bolstered China’s claims to leadership within the communist world. As Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated in the late 1960s with the ascent of Le Duan as the VWP’s paramount leader, Chinese propaganda continued to portray Ho as a close friend of China, emphasizing familial bonds to maintain the illusion of unity despite rising tensions.

By employing visual analysis of Chinese propaganda posters, state-issued photographs, paintings, and comics to examine Ho Chi Minh’s role in personal diplomacy and his strategic representation in Chinese political messaging, this study also methodologically builds upon the reliance on discursive sources that predominate the historiography of diplomacy. Photographs of Ho Chi Minh’s private visits with CCP leaders and propaganda materials deploying Ho Chi Minh as a symbol served as diplomatic artifacts and political instruments, providing us with a deeper understanding of how Chinese and Vietnamese officials framed their relations with each other. This visual and discursive grammar persists today, shaping contemporary Sino-Vietnamese relations through state discourse and historical memory in China.

Selections of the visual materials mentioned above will be presented in chronological order, paralleling the course of the war, to illustrate shifts in Ho Chi Minh’s portrayal and their impact on Sino-Vietnamese relations.