In Shanxi and Henan, the CCP systematically mobilized militias, integrating them into guerrilla networks and village self-defense structures. Their role extended far beyond direct combat. By managing logistics, collecting funds, and controlling arms distribution, they performed crucial functions that kept the Communist war effort alive. Just as important, militia units helped the CCP tighten its grip on rural society, fostering local political loyalty and enforcing revolutionary policies. After 1949, the new regime continued to rely on a mix of forces—the People’s Liberation Army, militias, former peasant associations, and public security agents—to establish and maintain local control. The paper also takes a comparative approach, examining how the Nationalist government organized its own localized defense forces. Unlike the Communist militias, Nationalist self-defense units often faced difficulties in recruitment, loyalty, and effectiveness.
By analyzing the organization, logistics, and political functions of militias, this study challenges the conventional notion that they were mere peripheral actors. Instead, it argues that militia mobilization was central to both the CCP’s military resilience and its postwar consolidation of power. A comparison with Nationalist forces further underscores how local armed groups shaped the broader dynamics of China’s revolution, offering new insights into mass participation and state-building during this transformative period.