The Application of the Theory of Groupthink to the Cuban Missile Crisis

Diplomatic historians rarely find common ground with specialists in international relations. Simply put, IR is far too theoretical a discipline. Ironically, the theory that probably bears the most relevance for diplomatic history was not even originated by an IR specialist, but social psychologist Irving L. Janis. Explaining why groups often make the wrong decisions, Janis argued that individuals within these groups unwittingly conform their ideas and opinions to the general consensus.

As far as the administration of U.S. President John F. Kennedy is concerned, Janis believed the Bay of Pigs best illustrated how group dynamics can promote faulty decision-making. By contrast, Janis had high regard for the way the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) operated during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

I differ with Janis. I would argue that faulty premises did guide ExCom throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis. Namely, the Kennedy administration assumed the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had placed missiles in Cuba as part of a wider conspiracy against West Berlin. In fact, the Soviet were responding to the dual U.S. threats of nuclear missiles in neighboring Turkey, and covert operations against Cuba. Moreover, individuals who argued against the consensus were punished, namely Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Just because Stevenson favored a peaceful resolution to the crisis, short of a naval blockade, the White House smeared him as an appeaser in the tradition of Neville Chamberlain.