Jordan: Did the US Hold Together a Nation of Dissenting Voices?

Rising Palestinian resistance in Jordan in the summer of 1970 culminated in PLO fighters violently taking over multiple cities, creating and enforcing their own rules independent of the monarchy, and even declaring “The Republic of Palestine” in northwest Jordan. When King Hussein’s army was on the brink of mutiny, he assembled a provisional military government and declared war against PLO fighters on September 17, beginning the Jordanian civil war. At the beginning of this civil war, the UK and Israel debated Hussein’s capacity for victory and debated whether to support him or to support the PLO and allow Jordan to potentially become a Palestinian state or be divided among Syria and Iraq. The diplomatic assistance of the U.S. and Israel’s threat of military intervention are often credited for King Hussein’s narrow victory by the end of September 1970–which secured Jordan’s relative stability as a nation in the Middle East. However, U.S. diplomatic communications reveal that a durable sense of Jordanian nationalism which began developing in 1967 was more instrumental than foreign military support in sustaining King Hussein’s regime. Radical Arab guerrillas’ actions against Israel drove Nasser and Hussein into a moderate alliance which would form the basis of Jordanian nationalism. At the same time, U.S. incentives to avoid a major superpower confrontation afforded King Hussein the time and space to mobilize his nationalistic army and government.

Diplomatic exchanges in the U.S. among executive branch officials, the National Security, and the Department of State reveal that King Hussein and many of his advisors were willing to confront violent fedayeen forces that were threatening his government since early 1970. Throughout rising tensions in June, the young King purified his cabinet of advisors who opposed such orders while maintaining his public image as a “symbol” of unity for the army, trans-jordanian tribes, and conservatives. In January 1970, the kidnapping of Israeli Shmuel Rosenwasser by Arab guerrillas in Jordan pushed the UK for the first time to encourage Jordan to accept U.S. proposals, while uniting Egypt’s Nasser and Hussein around a more moderate policy toward Israel. The September 1970 plane hijackings, paradoxically, deteriorated public support for the fedayeen further. The fedayeen were not only divided but lacked support from Arab leaders and Palestinians in Jordan–King Hussein appealed to a people who longed for a nation that promised peace amidst chaos.

Diplomatic documents, King Hussein’s speeches, and population counts of Palestinians and Jordanians in Jordan before and after September 1970 reveal how failure of the Palestinian nationalist movement strengthened King Hussein’s promise of peace for his people. Jordan’s Palestinian population did not fall but began to identify with King Hussein’s promises. The U.S.’s desire to prevent superpower conflict in the region did not prop up an empty nation but gave the gave the young King a chance to realize Jordan’s budding nationalism which was rooted in public frustration and an alliance with Nasser.