The Agricultural Roots of Industrialization in Taiwan, 1950–60

This paper argues that Taiwan’s rapid industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s was unplanned and accidental. While scholars have long held that Taiwan economic miracle was the outcome of state design under the direction of techno-bureaucratic planners, this paper shows that political and military considerations for food production ended up driving industrialization. In a case of friction in the American-Chinese partnership during the 1950s, the partners disagreed over how to deploy Taiwan’s substantial surplus of staple grain. Preparing for a final confrontation with Chinese Communist forces following the possible loss of American protection, Chiang Kai-shek viewed staple grain as a vital resource in defense of his island retreat. His integration of rice reserves into a defensive strategy led to unintended and lasting consequences. In addition to creating an island-wide food crisis, the diversion of grain grown with the help of economic aid from the United States derailed the patron’s plan to create a regional grain-basket.