Drawing on party archives, memoirs, and published documents, this paper examines the party’s culture of documentation in the 1920s and 1930s. I show that while the Chinese communists learned from the Soviets early on, it did not fully replicate the Bolshevik model. As the CCP moved from mobilizing the urban working class to the Chinese countryside, it confronted new operational realities: cadres were illiterate, communication of documents precarious, and compliance with centralized commands by no means certain. Bureaucratic writing had to be re-invented; in the reverse direction, it also changed the CCP and created a malleable structure of power that uneasily combined elements of campaign-style mass mobilization and Leninist bureaucratization. While many insurgent groups existed before and since the CCP, few succeeded in building an enduring party and state structure. The CCP, which graduated from guerrilla warfare to become the world’s largest (and one of its) political parties, is thus a remarkable case study, one that will shed light on the centrality of information control in party organization and its key role in maintaining the CCP’s continued rule in China today.