Mission Accomplished? American Political and Cultural Perspectives on the Iraq War, 20 Years Later

AHA Session 231
Sunday, January 8, 2023: 9:00 AM-10:30 AM
Congress Hall C (Loews Philadelphia Hotel, 4th Floor)
Chair:
Troy R.E. Paddock, Southern Connecticut State University
Comment:
The Audience

Session Abstract

Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, set in motion dramatic events in American society. After the defeat of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the routing of al-Qaeda from its bases there, the George W Bush administration determined to pursue “regime change” in Iraq. The US invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003.

With the January 2002 “Axis of Evil” State of the Union speech, President Bush kicked off a propaganda campaign for an invasion of Iraq. The campaign rested on two central threat themes: Iraqi possession of “WMD” and the nightmarish and fanciful notion of an Iraq-al-Qaeda “nexus,” (whereby Saddam Hussein would pass on to al-Qaeda his WMD and al-Qaeda would use them to attack the US again). As proclaimed by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, the “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.”

The escalating campaign for “regime change” won the day in Congress but also generated tensions in American society. Opposition to administration policy was given voice in the streets and by political figures and cultural celebrities. A dramatic instance of the latter was when the country music group, the Dixie Chicks, announced their disapproval of the president and the war fever generated by his administration. A backlash ensued that undermined the group’s popularity and saw them ostracized from the country music scene.

Tensions at home were eclipsed by the Coalition invasion of Iraq. A “shock and awe” bombing campaign led to a staged presidential proclamation a mere six weeks later that the US had “removed an ally of al-Qaeda.” Events on the ground in Iraq, however, did not conform to the declaration of “Mission Accomplished.” A series of assaults gave way to a burgeoning insurgency which required more forces.

But post-Vietnam War legislation in the US, notably the ending of the military draft, called forth new dynamics and new forces. In particular, the US military had to rely heavily on National Guard and US Army Reserve units to provide enough troops for the invasion and occupation. Whereas during the Vietnam War the National Guard gained the deserved reputation as the place to be if one did not want to deploy, Operation Desert Storm of 1991—which crushed Iraqi forces and pushed them out of Kuwait—served to weaken US Army leadership fears that a deployment depending on the mobilization of reserve forces would fail. With this example the stage was set for the deployment of Guard and Reserve forces on a larger scale in Iraq.

It was not just greater numbers of Reserve forces that would be deployed to Iraq. A lack of civilian oversight also saw private security contractors come to serve as a counterweight for the dearth of necessary US service members. The use of significant numbers of private security contractors allowed civilian policy makers to avoid clearly articulating the justification for additional service members to the American people. It also permitted military leaders to become far too comfortable with the use of these private forces.

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