Friday, January 6, 2023: 2:30 PM
Independence Ballroom II (Philadelphia Marriott Downtown)
Hilary Francis, Northumbria University at Newcastle
In recent years, historians have begun to try to periodise and conceptualise US military intervention in the period since the end of the Cold War. The ‘forever war’ has been characterised by high spending but relatively low US casualty rates and a marked deterioration in public interest and engagement with a seemingly endless series of conflicts. In many ways, this detachment has allowed successive administrations a relatively free hand, but policymakers have nonetheless become increasingly concerned about the lack of public support for military adventures. In response, they have repeatedly tried and failed to win hearts and minds at home. This focus on domestic public opinion has meant that the minutiae of military strategy are now completely intertwined with concerns about how each operation will play at home.
This paper will argue that the Contra War (1980-1990) marks a pivotal turning point in the US approach to waging war. Reagan’s massive escalation in military spending was tolerated because he used proxy forces like the Contras, keeping US casualty rates low. In other words, Reagan established the key ingredients for what we now describe as ‘forever war’. Like his successors, Reagan was not satisfied with this arrangement. His administration repeatedly sought massive ‘wins’, cajoling Contra troops into large set-piece battles that tried and failed to win the attention and admiration of voters at home.
The Contra War marks a critical juncture in the recent history of US warfare. The fact that this is rarely recognised demonstrates the continuing importance of bringing non-state actors back in.