The Dominance and Decline of Court Dress in the UK and US: From Witness for the Prosecution (1957) to My Cousin Vinny (1992)

Is there today a valid reason why lawyers, judges and functionaries garb themselves in specialty garments, given that many courts have abandoned wigs and robes? A valid reason excludes ‘that’s how we’ve always done it’ or its Doppelgänger ‘that’s what the public has come to expect’. In his Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons (1776-1818; 4 vols) John Hatsell offered a rather angular comment on traditional choreography. ‘It is more material that there should be a rule to go by, than what that rule is’. There have been serious attempts to fix benchmarks, at both a micro- and macro-level of abstraction. We do things after a certain fashion to measure our rate of progress, that is, to maintain well-modulated organic change. I refer to studies of Chief Justice Sir Matthew Hale and Wm. Blackstone. Court dress has been justified as an unvarnished barrier to market entry, typically by excluding women from professional life or marginalizing them. The ‘pantsuit’ contretemps (in the US) is an example. Cadre-attire – Ede & Ravenscroft, Chancery Lane preferred – is defended in the UK, although it is one of the means by which the profession defends its ranks against competition. Functionally considered, legal and parliamentary systems which have abandoned court dress have not suffered degradation of performance. On the other hand, sartorial traditions cannot be defended on the ground that they promote productivity gains. As Adam Smith would have argued, the useful life of a habit of garment wearing does not guarantee that benefits to consumers will outweigh the burdens.