Fixing the Maritime Frontier: Diagrams of Coastal Garrisons (Yingxun Tu) in 18th- and 19th-Century China

The Qing Empire was purportedly presented as a continental power that failed to recognize its maritime obligations. At one time, it was believed that the Qing only began to concede the importance of maritime governance after its defeat to the British in the First Opium War. It was also believed that most of the Qing subsequent efforts to strengthen its naval capability were met with failure. Recently, however, a group of maritime historians has challenged the above notions, arguing that the Qing was not necessarily a land-based power that did not recognize its connection to the maritime world. This paper aims to reinforce and amplify the approaches taken by these historians. Thus, it features the “new Qing maritime consciousness” through an analysis of a set of yingxun tu or “diagrams of coastal garrisons.” Most of these diagrams are preserved at the British Library but, to date, have received little scholarly attention. For the purposes of this study, yingxun tu allows us to appreciate some crucial facets of the Qing’s projection of sovereign power across its coastal watery spaces prior to a series of Sino-Western military encounters. Collectively, these diagrams help expose the fact that the Qing was not apathetic towards its maritime administration, but was proactive in 1) surveying the micro-ecologies and micro-geographies of its maritime frontier; 2) dividing the sea space into inner and outer oceans, both conceptually and practically; 3) actualizing a land-sea protection tactic, cartographically; and 4) defining strategic locations and efficient maritime routes for its navies. This paper also addresses whether the highlights that are evidenced in the yingxun tu diagrams show any connections with later notions of maritime space and governance/sovereignty in the second half of the nineteenth century.