The Political Economy of Protection: US Military Bases in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain

This paper analyzes the political economy of the American military presence in the Gulf. First I offer two alternative explanations for the unprecedented level of economic support provided by the three countries, each of which offsets the stationing costs by over 60%, almost double the NATO average. I argue that the American presence 1) further consolidates the power of the ruling families and 2) is associated with higher levels of foreign investment in the Gulf monarchies by improving their risk assessment ratings. My paper is divided into four parts. The first three sections focus respectively on the history, strategy, and economic reality of the US military presence in the Gulf. I will first discuss the history of expansion into the Middle East since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and outline the three key elements of the post-Cold War era basing strategy. Second, I will discuss the ongoing strategic debate over the US presence in the region. This debate essentially revolves around the question of how successful the post-Cold War basing strategy has been and whether or not a large US presence in the Middle East is viable in the long run. Finally, I will look at the economic dimension of the US presence by using official data from the Department of Defense. Here I will endeavor to shed some light on a deceptively simple question: Who is paying for the bases?