The Rule of Law and the Collapse of Congress in Colombia, 1947–49

The paper examines the relationship between the rule of law, representative institutions, and

extreme political crises. It is a study of the obstacles—and alternatives—to liberal constitutional

rule, and the pitfalls and potential of representative institutions in Latin America. The paper

posits that Colombia’s mid-century political crisis was related to the rule of law as much as to

the civil war known as “La Violencia.” It argues that the collapse of Congress in 1949 was the

result of legal and constitutional innovations that pushed elite infighting to new levels. The

Liberal constitutional reform of 1945 replaced indirect elections to the Senate with universal

male suffrage. In turn, the introduction of bipartisan proportional representation through the

so-called “law of electoral quotient” forced party leaders to reconsider majority rule and

jeopardized the constitutional protection of political minorities. Through the study of the 1947-

49 Congress, the paper follows the Liberal Party’s parliamentary revolt and the reaction of the

Conservative President and Cabinet. It claims that the latter, unable to protect the state from

itself, declared a state of siege and launched a crusade to remake the constitution and the rule

of law. The paper is thus a study of institutional origins and change in a period of great

upheaval. It examines the long-term dimensions of state-building, democratization, and the

creation of constitutional structures through a “deep history” analysis of Congressional

debates.