U.S. Alliance Politics and Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Cases of Franco-Pakistani and West German-Indian Nuclear Relations, 1974–78

This paper, based on multi-archival research in France, the United States and the United Kingdom, examines the 1974 Franco-Pakistani agreement for a plutonium-reprocessing plant, and the West German-Indian Borsig compressor case. It explores the tensions between U.S. nonproliferation goals on one hand, and political and economic interests of its Cold War allies on the other. The two cases are set in the context of (a) the rising demand for nuclear energy in the wake of the 1973 oil price shock, and (b) the heightened U.S. counterproliferation efforts in the wake of India’s 1974 nuclear test. The paper argues that although the United States strongly opposed both the Franco-Pakistani as well as the West German-Indian nuclear cooperation during this period, Washington opted for a low-key strategy when applying pressures on its NATO allies, and promises of increased military hardware when dealing with its South Asian ally. Giscard d’Estaing’s stricter nonproliferation policy in the Franco-Pakistani case, and Canadian, British and French efforts to expand the Zangger Committee “trigger list” in the West German-Indian case, complemented U.S. efforts and terminated both agreements by 1978. The objective of this research is four-fold: to study (a) the motivations of the allied nuclear supplier states to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to second-tier proliferators, (b) U.S. counterproliferation strategy towards the allied nuclear supplier states during this phase of the Cold War, c) how U.S. counterproliferation strategy qualitatively differed when applied to its NATO allies and when applied to its non-NATO ally, namely, Pakistan, and d) what kinds of maneuvers were the United States left with when dealing with a non-ally/non-enemy, namely, India.