The Antimonies of American Global Power: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Emergence of the Second Baathist Regime in Iraq

This paper contributes to the panel theme: “The United States and the Middle East: The End of the American Century?” by interrogating what the “American Century” was, and how it operated in the Middle East. After first exploring the concept of an “American Century” and how it relates to traditional notions of empire and hegemony, my paper looks specifically at U.S. foreign policy toward the Baathist government that took power in Iraq in July 1968.  I investigate the extent to which Iraq in the late 1960s and early 1970s should be considered a part of the “American Century.” What was the U.S. relationship to Iraq prior to the Baath’s 1968 coup? How did US foreign policymakers respond to the emergence of a Baathist government in Iraq? How did the emergence of a Baathist government in Iraq affect the regional oil economy?

Drawing on a variety of archival and published sources, I show that while the Baathist coup forestalled a burgeoning oil nationalization movement in Iraq, U.S. foreign policy-makers were unable to develop a clear and decisive response to the emerging Baathist regime in Iraq. Despite repeated overtures from Baathist leaders seeking American support between 1968 and 1970, American policy-makers remained divided amongst themselves. One faction advocated embracing the Baath as means of stabilizing western oil interests in the region. An opposing faction perceived the Baath as a potential ally of the Soviet Union and a threat to Israel.

American fears of Baathist-Soviet alignment proved a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the American refusal to accommodate the Baath, led the government in Baghdad to seek Soviet support. Drawing on this support, the Baath nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). I argue that this development did indeed undermine the structure of American power in the region.