History Should Be on Our Side: Soviet Frustration with Their Communist “Friends” and Their Inability to Overcome Western Influences in Occupied Austria, 1945–55

Friday, January 7, 2011: 9:50 AM
Room 308 (Hynes Convention Center)
Sean Philip Brennan , University of Scranton, Scranton, PA
Following the enormously costly victory in WWII, the Soviet Union dominated half of Europe, and rapidly rebuilt nations along Stalinist political, economic, and social lines. The Soviet occupation zone of Austria was the one territory that avoided “Stalinization,” but this was not for a lack of trying on the part of the Soviet authorities. The leadership of the KPO was in constant contact with Soviet authorities in both Moscow and Vienna concerning party and political tactics. The Soviet authorities, flush with the great victory over fascism, felt that the rise of the KPO to a position of ultimate power was simply a matter of time. Soon, Soviet ideology would replace outdated, “Western” and bourgeois methods of thinking—particularly religious belief—among the Catholic population of Austria.

However, as the occupation continued and the Cold War intensified, the Soviet’s reports frequently noted the inability of Soviet and/or KPO ideology to appeal over the propaganda of the “Anglo-Americans” and their political allies in Austria, despite the fact that the war had proven the superiority of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. More importantly, religious belief persisted among much of the Austrian population, and the Catholic Church emerged as one of the most important institutions in the immediate postwar era in Austria. What developed among the Soviet authorities, especially those in charge of propaganda for the Austrian population, was a crisis of belief in the atheistic Soviet ideology, particularly regarding the USSR’s ability to import it to the heart of Europe. Using recently declassified Soviet documents, Brennan examines how this disillusionment occurred over the ten year-occupation, especially after the KPO’s most ambitious bid for political power, the Great Industrial Strike of 1950.  He also examines how this disillusionment may have contributed to the decision by the Soviet government to give up the dream of Communist Austria in 1955.