The Long War: An Interim Assessement

The tenth anniversary of the Long War, formerly known as the Global War on Terror, approaches.  The war began in 2001 Afghanistan.  In 2003, the main effort shifted to Iraq, before reverting back to Afghanistan in 2009.  Pakistan has emerged as the Long War's third -- and perhaps most dangerous -- front.  Intermittent skirmishing occurs in various other locations such as Somalia, Yemen, and the southern Philippines.  There is quite literally no end to this war in sight.  Most Americans accept this prospect of open-ended conflict with resignation; some embrace it with enthusiasm. My paper will describe the evolution of US war aims since the Long War began, will assess successes achieved and failures experienced thus far, and will speculate on the course of events to come. I will emphasize two points.  The first point is that the United States launched this war with a well-defined, if utterly unrealistic strategy in mind;  since the collapse of that strategy in Iraq, it has failed to devise a substitute -- in short, Washington operates today in a strategic vacuum, improvisation having long since replaced principle.   The second point is that from the outset, there has been a massive gap between what the US has sought to achieve and the means made available to pursue those ends; this disparity has only increased over time -- in short, Washington courts insolvency, the satisfaction of immediate demands taking precedence over longer term considerations.