Saturday, January 9, 2010: 9:20 AM
Manchester Ballroom I (Hyatt)
In the last four decades, law-making and legal institutions have become
central sites for processes of decolonization in settler societies such as
Aotearoa-New Zealand, Australia and in the United States (in this paper I
will focus on Hawai'i) as indigenous people in these places have demanded
that their rights be recognized and their grievances attended to. These
demands involve the righting of history and they have also stimulated a
re-writing of history, for instance, through the incorporation of
indigenous versions of the colonial past into national histories. But in
the court, what has become manifest is that indigenous people do not
themselves ‘have' history nor are they even ‘in' history. In order
to claim their rights, indigenous people have to show how traditional they
are. This traditionalism is defined in law such that the more modern
indigenous people show themselves to be, the more engaged in history, they
less authentically indigenous they appear to judges. In this paper, I
argue that this racialization of indigenous people is, in fact, deeply
embedded in settler societies and even in the modern disciplinary practices
of law and of history. Without reducing the important differences between
the purposes of each discipline - in law's case, to judge the past, and
in history's to understand it – I argue that their shared evidentiary
premises actually place firm limits around what we think history is. In
the political context of decolonization, such limits are exposed even as
various professionals attempt to expand their disciplines' reach and
incorporate other ways of relating the past and the present.
See more of: Race, Nation, and Indigeneity in the Colonial and Postcolonial Pacific
See more of: AHA Sessions
See more of: AHA Sessions