Washington, the "Castro Phenomena," and African Nationalism, 1958–65

During the late 1950s/early 1960s American policy makers were faced with the dilemma of the extent to which they should support African nationalism.  Few in Washington’s inner circle of power had any knowledge or experience with the continent.  Instead these decision makers turned to their experience with Cuba’s Fidel Castro as their reference point from which to evaluate where African leaders fell on the nationalist/socialist/communist spectrum.  This paper will utilize case studies of U.S. relations with Sekou Toure (Guinea), Patrice Lumumba (Congo), and Ben Bella (Algeria) to illustrate how paranoia over the possibility of ‘the next Castro’ influenced American policy makers in their approach towards these leaders and their countries.
While some African leaders played to the American fear of ‘the next Castro’ as a means of seeking increased aid from Washington, others were not eager to fully align themselves with either bloc in the Cold War, preferring instead to pursue a non-aligned nationalist or Pan-Africanist foreign policy.  With its ‘with us or against us’ mindset, Foggy Bottom too often viewed the later category as potential Castros in the making rather than as genuine neutrals.  By repeatedly invoking the analogy of ‘the next Castro’ in their assessments of African nationalists, Washington formed a misconception of the continent’s foremost leaders and missed an opportunity to better U.S. relations with Africa and the wider developing world.