Independence or Death! Invasion, Violence, and Political Possibility in East Timor

Conventional narratives of East Timor’s modern history portray the Indonesian invasion of 1975 as a cruel interruption of the country’s natural path toward independence. A closer reading suggests that the invasion altered the political terrain in more complicated ways – creating a notion of East Timorese identity that had until then been only dimly imagined, while rendering inaudible a fledgling political discourse – about education, health, and social justice. With the invasion, that discussion was supplanted by one that focused almost exclusively on questions of national identity and survival – a discourse captured in the slogan “Independence or Death!”

Yet if the invasion was critical in altering political discourse and practice inside East Timor, it was made more likely by a unique conjuncture of conditions outside the territory. Most conspicuously, the invasion played out against the backdrop of the Cold War and the ‘loss’ of Vietnam, both of which conditions predisposed the United States to support Indonesian plans. The invasion was also conditioned by the particular circumstances of Indonesian politics in late 1975, and by the unusual power of the Indonesian Army. Had any part of that constellation been different, it is likely that Indonesia would not have invaded, and that East Timor’s modern history would not have been so grossly misshapen by decades of violence.

Support for that claim, paradoxically, lies in the circumstances that led to East Timor’s independence through a UN-sponsored referendum in 1999. With the Cold War over, the Indonesian Army on the defensive, and East Timor awash in international observers, the advocates of independence adopted a posture of strict non-violence in response to concerted attacks by pro-Indonesian forces. That approach facilitated the deployment of a UN-backed force in mid-September 1999, which quickly stopped the violence and paved the way for East Timor’s independence.