Presidential Power in Foreign Relations: The Use and Abuse of Alexander Hamilton

Recent invocations of Alexander Hamilton's views on presidential power to justify a broad executive prerogative in warmaking and foreign affairs invites renewed examination and analysis of Hamilton's writings on the scope of executive power.  Advocates of presidential prerogative in foreign relations have sought support for their positions in Hamilton's arguments as Pacificus in his famous debate with Helvidius (James Madison).  These efforts  have exaggerated Hamilton's view of discretionary executive authority in the conduct of  foreign affairs.  Unlike modern presidents, for example, Hamilton never asserted a unilateral executive warmaking power.  He acknowledged, throughout his career, that the War Power was constitutionally vested in Congress.  Nor did he claim an expansive presidential authority under the Recognition Power.  Rather, with relatively few exceptions, Hamilton shared Madison's views on the scope of executive power in foreign relations.  This paper represents a fresh review of Hamilton's writings on presidential power in foreign affairs. It constitutes an effort to confront the abuse of Hamilton's views.  As we shall see, Hamilton attributed to the president little in the way of discretionary executive power in foreign relations.  As a result, efforts to invoke his writings to defend an expansive executive power in warmaking and foreign affairs are misplaced.